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ABSTRACT 
Paulina Lopez: Criminal Justice Reform In the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland 
Pre-Trial Detention and Post-Conviction Access to Legal Representation 
(Under the direction of Donald Searing) 
 
There is a serious problem in the US, UK, and Ireland with both lengthy pre-trial 
detention, which is often used to persuade guilty pleas, and access to legal aid while incarcerated, 
which is a barrier for justice in cases with new and or untested exonerating evidence.  Societal 
pressures contribute to a legislative and law-enforcement culture that values convictions over 
justice, and results in systemic corruption.  While this is partially a political culture problem, it 
can certainly be ameliorated with targeted legislation.  The hypothesis is that differences in these 
countries’ laws contribute to lengthy pre-trial detention and limit inmates’ access to legal aid.  
This research compares the relative situations of the three countries using quantitative data, 
considers literature regarding the effect of caseload pressure on these outcomes, compares the 
relevant legislation and implementation thereof, and draws out conclusions and 
recommendations, all with the aim of suggesting potential improvements.   
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE ISSUES 
 
Introduction 
 Criminal Justice reform in the United States has been a highly politicized concern, many 
aspects of which have been the subject of heated debate.  In the US, judges and prosecutors are 
elected, campaigning on their high “success” rates as being tough on crime.  Ireland also suffers 
from these political problems, as elected officials refuse to pass legislation acknowledging 
international human rights laws.  The media has highlighted a multitude of cases illustrating 
egregious dysfunctionality in the system, largely due to lack of resources, negligence, or blatant 
disregard for due process and rights.  Many of these systemic issues center around two key issue 
areas: pre-trial (and lengthy trial) detention and wrongful conviction.  The United States, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland will be used in this comparative policy analysis.  The United 
Kingdom and Ireland share similar historical and cultural roots in their systems, including the 
use of Barristers and Solicitors rather than one attorney for both the client and the court.  
However, it is the differences in their legislation and implementation that make them excellent 
comparative case studies.  The United Kingdom has progressive bail laws which allow for time 
spent on house arrest and other limiting circumstances to be counted towards one’s sentence.  
However, at the same time, it has passed legislative amendments to reduce access to legal aid 
while incarcerated.  Ireland is an exemplary case study of what not to do.  As the following data 
and analyses will show, Ireland maintains regressive laws and customs which make it next to 
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impossible for someone to seek legal representation while incarcerated or to redress any 
malpractice. 
 A striking example of systemic failures in pre-trial detention and trial lengths in the U.S. 
is the case of Kalief Browder, who was detained in Riker’s Island for three years on suspicion of 
stealing a backpack (Gonnerman, 2014).  While his trial was continually postponed, he suffered 
enduring physical punishments and pressure to plead guilty in order to be released, only to have 
the case finally be dismissed due to the lack of evidence against him (Gonnerman, 2014).  It is 
difficult to measure detention resulting from continual postponement of trials, but pre-trial 
detention and trial lengths can be measured separately, providing an adequate picture of the 
situation.  Wrongful conviction cases are also plentiful, with some data available.  A recent 
example of such a case is that of Luis Vargas, who was convicted in 1999 of three rapes, based 
on victim’s identification of a tattoo, which DNA testing has now shown to be the work of a 
“serial rapist” with a similar tattoo, who was active in the area at the time; Vargas was finally 
exonerated on the 23rd of November 2015, after serving sixteen years in prison (California 
Innocence Project, 2015; Associated Press, 2015).  Wrongful convictions, unfortunately, are also 
difficult to measure, as they are only identified by exoneration; thus, the majority of such cases, 
which are still unresolved, are not included in any such exoneration figures.  However, one can 
use the existing figures to make an estimate.  A 2008 study, using data for the percentage of 
prisoners who were sentenced to death and then found innocent or exonerated in the 70’s and 
80’s, estimated that even if only one percent of the “1.57 million prisoners” in custody at the end 
of 2012 were innocent, 15,700 innocent people would be incarcerated (Batts, 2014, p.3).  Still, 
there is no way to arrive at exact figures.  Additionally, the factors which may contribute to 
wrongful convictions, such as lack of resources for DNA testing or deliberate withholding of 
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evidence are not easily measured or confirmed.  However, the rights, resources, and procedures 
for incarcerated persons seeking legal representation, or exoneration, as well as the factors which 
contribute to long pre-trial detention times, can be examined.  In fact, these subjects have been 
studied, albeit sporadically and in limited cases, for decades.  
The connection between plea bargaining and pretrial detention, to which this thesis has 
previously alluded, is that the later induces a strain on the defendant which catalyzes the former.   
A 1978 study on plea bargaining found “that plea bargaining is ‘inevitable’” in lower-level 
courts (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.322).  Supporting this retroactively, a 1975 study found 
“that judges were biased,” assigning more cases to attorneys “who were disinclined to go to trial” 
and who charged “low fees” (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.322).  How does this circle back to 
pretrial detention?  In light of the studies mentioned above, Wheeler analyzed data from courts in 
Houston, Texas, and found “that pretrial detention was the most important predictor of prison 
disposition,” being correlated more strongly than any other factor considered, including whether 
or not the defendant had any prior “conviction[s]” (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.330).  The 
findings suggested that “bail decision[s]” effectively pre-sort defendants into two groups: those 
who will receive “probation,” and those who will be “imprison[ed]” (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, 
p.330).  This may be due to the fact that bail amounts and conditions are informed by the 
seriousness of the charge, locating the defendant on a criminality scale (Wheeler & Wheeler, 
1980, p.330) independent of guilt or innocence.  Such conditions discriminate against those who 
cannot afford to post bail (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.331).  Wheeler concluded that, based on 
these results, any “policy” which aims to decrease “pretrial detention” would improve the 
“fairness” of case outcomes (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.330).  The Wheelers specifically 
recommended a stronger “advocacy system” consisting of having a “legal defense” ready from 
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arrest, which is comprised of “independently assigned” council (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, 
p.330). They also advised being wary of reforms that only make the system more efficient 
without addressing its problems (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.332).  In order to consider and 
evaluate reform measures, it is important to identify and support with evidence the factors that 
contribute to the problem. 
 This thesis will examine data and literature with regards to pre-trial detainment, judicial 
caseload, and legal budgets.  It will compare the US, UK and Ireland in these issue areas.  
Quantitative data will be analyzed in conjunction with relevant legislation and existing studies 
detailing the requirements for and procedures surrounding the setting of bail, and limitations on 
access to legal representation while incarcerated (i.e. post-conviction).  My goal is to identify 
which factors may be contributing to the problem, and identify changes which may ameliorate 
the situation.  It is expected that there is a correlation between the budget for courts and legal aid 
and the two systemic failures of justice.  That is to say, I expect that the countries with 
proportionally smaller judicial system budgets will have more problematic policies.  A lack of 
funding leads to higher caseloads, which presumably delays trials.  The funding data will be 
compared with the pre-trial detention information.  As for the lack of recourse or barriers for 
recourse for the incarcerated is concerned, it is presumed that this may also be exacerbated by 
small budgets for forensic works, as well as, in some cases, by lack of legislation to provide such 
testing.  The US has enacted legislation to remedy this budgetary problem, and appears to be 
exonerating more people based on DNA evidence than are the UK and Ireland, thereby 
supporting this hypothesis.  The second hypothesis is that, given the vastly different patterns of 
detention and post-conviction access in our three countries, there will be notable differences in 
the legislation which structures the situations.  At least some of these differences in legislation 
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should be related to the different outcomes in terms of the two issues of interest.  This thesis will 
begin with a consideration of the literature, followed by a review of the available data, which 
supports the conclusions drawn from the literature.  We will conclude with an analysis of the 
legislation which affects and is affected by the budgets in the data. 
  
Existing Literature 
Since the 1920’s, there has been a scholarly debate over the extent to which pressure 
from high caseloads affects the handling of criminal cases (Nardulli, 1979, p.89).  In fact, the 
earliest study of the subject, entitled “the Cleveland Crime Survey,” found that having 
overburdened prosecutors led to many dismissals, higher rates of guilty verdicts, and occasional 
wrongful convictions; the report ended by proposing an increase in justice system resources 
(Nardulli, 1979, p.89).  Studies in the 1950’s had the same findings, with the additional 
observation that the drastic differences between plea and trial sentences, designed to encourage 
people to plead guilty to avoid the risks and uncertainty of a trial, contributed to “many 
substantive injustices” (Nardulli, 1979, p.89).  Other studies found the rise of this tactic to be an 
industry response to increases in caseloads, some going as far as to extend this to a new 
hypothesis as caseloads grow, plea bargain deal provisions would increase in kind (Nardulli, 
1979, p.90).  In addition to making plea bargaining the default procedure, “caseload pressure” 
was also found to contribute to increasing “delays”, treating defendants “inconsistent[ly]”, and 
“mishandl[ing]” cases (Nardulli, 1979, p.90).   These are not, by any means, new problems.  
Other studies on plea bargaining from this decade found that judges assign more cases to 
attorneys who will steer the defendant towards a plea bargain (Wheeler & Wheeler, 1980, p.322), 
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presumably to cut costs and increase efficiency.  Those studies also touched on the effect of bail 
(and by extension, pre-trial detention) on the likelihood of a prison sentence.  But what are some 
of the factors which play into these decisions? 
Scholars study how different factors affect “courtroom operations” by modeling the 
processes which occur behind the scenes, in which “dispositional strategy,” the manner in which 
cases are processed or disposed, is a key element (Nardulli, 1979, p.90).  The nature of these 
models is an identification of which actions and “inputs” produce which “outputs” (Nardulli, 
1979, p.90).  Traditionally, large caseloads were thought to play a key role in the “pervasive 
‘dysfunctioning’” of the justice system (Nardulli, 1979, p.89). The essence of this model is that 
formal processes directly, and caseload pressures confoundingly, contribute to the dispositional 
strategy, which results in the “criminal court outputs” (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  The presumption is 
that if caseload pressures were removed from the equation, the outputs would directly follow 
from the procedures exactly as intended (Nardulli, 1979, p.90).  Of course, this is an over-
simplification of the matter, as the rules and procedures of due process and the pressures of 
heavy caseloads are not the only two factors that affect the dispositional strategy and outcome of 
a court system.  This is where the “legal man assumption” comes into play; the above input-
output model of a court system implicitly assumes that those who pursue careers in law are 
inclined to follow all procedures ethically (Nardulli, 1979, p.90).  Less blindly optimistic, 
another implied assumption is that most courtrooms are struggling under massive caseloads that 
preclude the actors from following normal procedures, which they would do otherwise (Nardulli, 
1979, p.90-91).    However, in reality, the legal man does not always default to procedure.  The 
perfect illustration of this occurred in North Carolina in 2012. 
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In a North Carolina criminal case, the preliminary field test was positive for blood 
while the more accurate lab test later produced a negative result, but only the preliminary test 
was admitted as evidence, a “serologist claimed that lab procedure did not require” her to 
report “negative confirmatory tests” (Giannelli, 2012 p.1).  Instead, the procedure was to 
report positive results “even if more specific tests” contradict them (Giannelli, 2012 p.1).  It 
was claims such as this which brought into question all lab reports “from 1987-2003” with 
potential withholding or misrepresentation of crucial information for the defense (Giannelli, 
2012 p.1).   This was due to policies which forgo “objectivity” and clarity of reporting 
guidelines, in favor of too much individual discretion, and a “lack of transparency…and 
oversight” (Giannelli, 2012 p.1).   The misreporting happened in the aforementioned way, 
ignoring a negative “confirmatory” test, as well as claiming no more tests were done when 
they actually were done and were “negative or inconclusive” (Giannelli, 2012 p.1).  The 
investigation revealed a “prosecutorial bias,” as the aforementioned disparities in reporting 
only hid exculpatory evidence (negative results), whereas positive results “were always 
included in final laboratory reports” (Giannelli, 2012 p.2).  The general consensus was that 
the crime labs had a deep-rooted “pro-police bias” which undermined “true scientific 
investigation methods” in favor of convictions (Giannelli, 2012 p.2-3).  If the police and 
prosecutorial culture encourages the hiding and falsification of evidence, then one of the 
logical steps is to separate the crime labs from the state, so that they aren’t directly connected 
to the police or the prosecution.  Luckily, this scandal was large enough that the North 
Carolina legislature had to respond with reforms, which will be discussed in the final section.  
The aforementioned analytical model of courtroom procedures holds that when caseloads 
exceed resources “speed and compromise begin to displace due process values” in court 
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operations and disposition of cases (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  This model holds caseload pressures 
to be the cause of “the observed dysfunctioning in criminal courts” (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  This 
idea, coupled with the legal man assumption, leads to the conclusion that increasing resources, 
thus alleviating caseload pressure, would solve the system’s problems (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  It 
is this train of thought that traditionally structured reforms and recommendations (Nardulli, 
1979, p.91).  The factors which influence a “sentencing decision;” as per the rules “of due 
process,” should be “the seriousness of the case, the defendant’s penological needs, and his 
conduct since his arrest” (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  Caseload pressure, however, introduces 
additional factors that may even override those on which the decision should procedurally be 
based; such factors include “guilty plea,” the type of trial (judge or jury), and how well the 
defendant adhered to “informal courtroom norms” (Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  As alluded to earlier, 
the theory holds that as caseload pressure increases, the importance of these new factors 
increases with it, and so would increase the sentencing gap between plea bargains and trials 
(Nardulli, 1979, p.91).  One would expect to find, therefore, a positive correlation between 
caseload pressure and guilty pleas and a negative correlation between caseload pressure and 
guilty plea sentences. This exacerbates the tendency of “prosecutors and judges” to pressure 
defendants to plead guilty in order to alleviate the caseload pressure, for there would not 
otherwise be enough resources to bring all cases to trial (Narduli, 1979, p.94). 
This perhaps too straight-forward model was the classical school of thought. In 1975, 
Malcolm Feeley published an empirical study suggesting that reducing caseload pressure alone 
does not result in a higher proportion of cases going to trial (as opposed to plea bargaining) 
(Nardulli, 1979, p.91-92).  Specifically, Feeley found no difference in “trial rates…release 
statistics, bail structure, and sentencing structure” between “low-volume” and “high-volume” 
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courts (Nardulli, 1979, p. 92).   However, he did find a significantly more guilty pleas for lesser 
charges “in the high-volume court,” which was even higher when the original charges were 
felonies (Nardulli, 1979, p. 92).  Of the cases that went to trial, both the low and high volume 
courts spent the same average amount of time hearing each trial (Nardulli, 1979, p.92).  It is also 
important to note that, although Feeley did control for “manpower,” he examined the outputs 
without controlling for different inputs (Nardulli, 1979, p.93).  This increases uncertainty about 
the degree of influence which caseload pressure has on the observed differences in outcomes.  
Overall, these findings indicate that, although caseload pressure does have some impact on 
procedural trends (offering lesser charges in exchange for guilty pleas), it is not in itself a 
sufficient explanation for dysfunction in the system.   
 A comparative analysis of the other factors considered in this thesis leads to the 
preliminary conclusion that budget shortfalls are the most important factor contributing to 
dysfunction in the legal system.  However, the existing literature and historical studies strongly 
suggest that money alone does not solve the problem.  Hence, the primary focus of this research 
is to identify differences in the statutes themselves, which may affect the output of these justice 
systems.  However, before analyzing the laws themselves, the pressures and strains which drive 
these measures, primarily the budgets and caseloads, must be considered. 
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DATA 
 
Data for the UK and Ireland comes from the CEPEJ Report on European Judicial 
Systems 2014 report, which is based on 2012 figures from 45 countries (European Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.5-7).  Throughout the report, the UK statistics are often 
divided into three sections: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland; Since Northern 
Ireland and Scotland have different judicial systems, the England and Wales totals will be used 
as representative of the UK considered here.  Additionally, as it is a European report, the figures 
are in Euros.  As this CEPEJ report covers only the two European countries to be studied, the US 
data will come from US domestic sources and UN sources.  In its budgetary analysis, the CEPEJ 
subdivides the “judicial system” into three sections which are “court budget” (salaries and 
operational expenses), “legal aid,” and “prosecution services” (European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.19).  This budget for the “judicial system” is part of a larger overall 
“justice system” budget which also includes “prison,” “forensic[s],” and “probation,” among 
other things, depending on the country (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 
2014, p.19).  United Nations data tables used for the U.S. data will be described in more detail 
when they appear in the following section.   It is important to note, however, that while the 
European Commission does not include U.S. data, some of the U.N. data tables do not include 
both the U.K. and Ireland. The different statistics available, and the different presentations of 
data, impede the direct comparison of these figures.  However, the data can be compared 
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amongst those countries for which it is provided by the same source and against international 
averages where applicable.   
Additionally, with regards to the U.S., although the U.N. data tables show data for the 
nation as a whole, when we turn to the analysis of legislation later in the thesis we will need to 
narrow the focus to the state level, because state laws vary a great deal.  North Carolina and New 
York were chosen as exemplars of a more reformist state and a more non-reformist state, 
notwithstanding that both states have a mix of reformist and non-reformist tendencies in their 
political culture.   Overall, New York has taken more reformist measures, albeit in response to 
widespread systemic failures.  Interestingly enough, North Carolina has a vast database of 
statewide detailed statistics, going back many years, whereas New York has only the current 
fiscal budget and one year of caseload statistics for New York City available.  The biggest asset 
which the North Carolina data provides is the ages of pending cases and resolved cases.  These 
data are presented in the next section, after the E.U. and U.N. data.  This caseload and budget 
data, although not comparable to the other nations, provides support and context for the 
legislation discussion which follows it. 
 
Comparative Budget Data and Caseload Statistics 
This section will begin by examining the available budget statistics for the countries in 
question, to identify any striking differences in funding that may be contributing to systemic 
pressures.   
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TABLE 1 - UK AND IRELAND 2012 OVERALL COURT BUDGET DATA 
 
 
Total 
Justice System 
Budget (in Euros)
1
 
Justice System 
Budget as % of 
National 
Budget
2
 
% of Justice 
Budget 
allocated to 
Court System
3
 
Annual Court 
Budget per 
Inhabitant (in 
Euros)
4
 
Annual Court 
Budget as % of 
GDP per capita
5
 
Ireland 2 346 727 000 3.4 9.8 23.3 0.07 
UK England 
and Wales 
10 582 637 899 1.8 51.6 42.2 0.14 
1 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.21-22) 
2 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.24) 
3 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.25) 
4 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.30) 
5 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.31) 
 
The first statistic to consider is the overall budget for the justice system as a whole.  It is 
important to note that different countries include different things in their definition of the Justice 
System; for the UK and Ireland, the most important difference to note is that Ireland included 
prosecution in these budget figures while the UK did not (European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.22).  At first glance, this appears to mean that the Irish justice 
system is even more under-funded compared to the UK than the numbers suggest.  However, the 
overall percentage of the national budget is nearly the same.  The percentage of the Justice 
System budget allocated to the court system is a much still telling comparison.  Although the UK 
and Ireland allocate about the same percentage of their national budgets to the justice system, of 
that percentage, the UK allocates, on average, a third to the courts, while Ireland provides less 
than 10%.  To clarify further the meaning of these figures, per capita or per inhabitant figures 
serve to control for population differences and needs. 
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In both the court budget per inhabitant and as a percent of GDP per capita, Ireland 
budgeted half as much as the UK.  These numbers leave no doubt that Ireland falls short of its 
neighbors in terms of courtroom spending.  As the later analysis of laws and procedures will 
show, Ireland is also the worst offender at failing to meet the rights of its defendants and 
inmates.  However, budgetary differences, although they certainly impact what can be 
accomplished with the given resources, are not sufficient to explain the vast systemic differences 
in practices and outcomes observed in later sections.  The information, particularly about Ireland, 
will illustrate that there is a larger political culture problem at play. 
 One final statistical comparison to make is between the prosecution budgets in these 
countries versus their budgets for legal aid. 
 
TABLE 2 - ANNUAL PUBLIC PROSECUTION BUDGET IN EUROS PER INHABITANT IN 
2012 
 2012 Public Prosecution Budget 
(in Euros per Inhabitant) 
Ireland 8.8 
UK England and Wales 12.8 
Data from: (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.42) 
 
 TABLE 3 - LEGAL AID BUDGET DIVIDED BY CASE IN 2012 IN EUROS  
 2012 Legal Aid Budget 
(in Euros by case) 
Ireland 1,373 
Germany 434 
Italy 803 
Data from: (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.76) 
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For this statistic, the UK did not provide per case data, but it does specify that in the UK, minus 
Scotland, for which data was not available, 4,411 cases which were brought to trial were 
awarded legal aid (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, 2014, p.76).  This 
number could be used along with the budget figures to arrive at an approximate per-case 
calculation; however, such method would assume that all of the money budgeted for legal aid 
was used.  Rather than make such an assumption, here, in the table, are the figures for two other 
European countries, to provide a bit of comparison. 
 These numbers seem counter-intuitive.  While Ireland was near the bottom of the list, 
well below average on budget allotments as measured in the statistics above, especially with 
regards to its courts, it bizarrely seems to spend more than average on legal aid for each case.  
When coupled with qualitative data on Ireland’s systemic failures, this is puzzling.  Perhaps the 
inherent difficulties in the Irish judicial system make it more expensive to attempt to defend a 
client.  Even so, this does not discount the effect of the smaller, overall budget on the system.   
 The US data is aggregated from both international and domestic sources; the data 
available are different and in different formats than the previous report, and thus, exact 
comparisons cannot readily be made on this level.  One data source is a study on Pretrial 
Detention and Misconduct between 1995 and 2010 (Cohen, 2013 p.1).  Major findings include 
that pretrial detention increased by 184% in this time, largely due to a 664% surge in 
“immigration caseloads,” and that only around 5% of those released on bail during this time 
violated their bail in any way (Cohen, 2013 p.1).  The data tables also show that, over time, as 
the number of defendants in district courts increased over time, so did the percent of those cases 
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which were detained pretrial (Cohen, 2013 p.1).  The percentage of defendants which are 
detained pretrial also varies according to the type of offense; the data in the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics report includes figures to control for this disparity.   
While overall, in 2010, 80% of defendants in district courts were detained while awaiting 
trial, the detention rate of the violent charges was 87%, property charges was 41%, drug charges 
were detained at a rate of 84%, public-order offences at 50% weapons charges at 86% and 
immigration charges at 88% (Cohen, 2013, p.1-3).  It is logical that the violent offences, and the 
offence which usually involves capture and deportation, have the highest rates of pretrial 
detention.  As for the effect of criminal history on the likelihood of pretrial detention, in 2010, 
people with no prior arrests had a pretrial detention rate of 64%, which rose nine points to 73% 
for those with one arrest, to 79% for those with 2 to 4 arrests, to 85% for those with 5 or more 
arrests (Cohen, 2013, p.6).  This gradual increase is in line with what one would expect, although 
the detention rate for those with no prior arrests, the starting point, seems quite high.  A similar 
pattern was observed for increasing numbers of convictions, but with a slightly larger jump of 
eleven points from the group with no convictions at 67% to the group with one conviction at 
78%, followed by 2 to 4 convictions at 82%, and 5 or more at 87% (Cohen, 2013, p.6).  The rates 
also differed in terms of the types of criminal records; with those who have prior misdemeanor 
convictions detained only 75% of the time, as opposed to those with prior felony convictions at 
an average of 85% (Cohen, 2013, p.6).  The report further divides felonies into three categories, 
nonviolent offenses, which were detained 79% of the time, drug offenses, which were detained 
86% of the time, and violent offenses, which were detained 89% of the time (Cohen, 2013, p.6).  
There was also an observable difference in pretrial detention rates between those who have 
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appeared in court and those who have not, with the former being detained at a rate of 75% and 
the latter at 82% and 86% for one appearance or more respectively (Cohen, 2013, p.6).   
 Are such high rates of pretrial detention really necessary?  Given how long it can take for 
a case to be heard and to be completed, it would be prudent, both for the defendant’s sake and for 
the budget’s sake to release as many defendants on bond as possible.  How can one assess the 
necessity for pretrial detention?  One place to look would be the recidivism rate of those released 
on bond.  Of 35,564 defendants released on bail in 2010, only 17% had any kind of violation; 
15% were simply “technical violations,” and only 1% “failed to appear” (Cohen, 2013, p.8).  
Additionally, only 2% were rearrested for felony offences and also only 2% were rearrested for 
misdemeanors (Cohen, 2013, p.8).  This shows that, overall, the rate of bail violation, recidivism, 
and failure to appear is incredibly low.  However, this cannot, unfortunately, provide an accurate 
picture of what recidivism and violation rates would be for a larger sample size, as the people 
chosen to be released on bond, which are, given the high pretrial detention rates, a select few, are 
the ones which the judges had deemed to be the least likely to commit these infractions.  This 
diminishes the value of the low violation rates, as the sample is a hand-picked selection of 
precisely those individuals who are most cooperative.   
 An international source of additional statistics for the U.S. is the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime; this database offers the average number of prosecutors per 100,000 people 
between 2011and 2013 for many countries; although both the US and UK are on this list, Ireland 
is not (“Administration of Justice (2011-2013)”, 2013).  However, given how tiny its budget for 
prosecution was in comparison to the UK, it is safe to presume the Irish number is less than that 
of the U.K.  During these years, the U.S. had an average of 1.7 prosecutors per 100,000 
inhabitants, whereas the U.K. Northern Ireland had 10.1 and the U.K. Scotland had 9.9 
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(“Administration of Justice (2011-2013)”, 2013), resulting in an overall U.K average of 10 
prosecutors per 100,000 inhabitants.  This means that, controlling for population differences, the 
U.K. has nearly 6 times as many prosecutors as the U.S.  It stands to reason that having more 
resources facilitates efficiency.  Another statistic available from the United nations is the total 
number of persons held in pretrial detention in various countries; all three of the nations in 
question are on this list (“Statistics on Criminal Justice”, 2013); only the three most recent are 
included here.  As before, the UK is divided into nations in this data, so the England and Wales 
group is again used as representative. 
 
TABLE 4 – PRE-TRIAL DETENTION DATA 
 Total number of people in pre-trial detention 
Number of people in pre-trial detention per 
100,000 population 
Country 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
USA 445,800 451,200 453,200 141.6 142.1 141.6 
UK England 
and Wales 
8,299 7,671 7,743 14.8 13.6 13.6 
Ireland 606 498 N/A 13.4 10.9 N/A 
Data from: (“Statistics on Criminal Justice”, 2013).   
 
Although one would expect larger numbers from the US due to the population difference, 
even when controlled for population the difference in the proportion of Americans in pretrial 
detention is astounding.  Despite what one may be inclined to believe given the outright refusal 
to acknowledge prisoners’ rights in Ireland, it actually has the lowest rates of pretrial detention of 
these three nations.  The United States, on the other hand, has over ten times the proportion of its 
population in pretrial detention, and six times that of the UK.  This highlights the key 
confounding factor in these numbers.  It is common knowledge that the United States is a world 
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leader in the percentage of its population which is behind bars.  That being said, it is perhaps no 
surprise that it also has a much higher proportion of its population in pretrial detention. 
 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also has statistics on the average duration 
of prison sentences in various countries; however, the United States is not included in this 
particular database (“Special data Collection on Persons held in Prisons (2010-2012)”, 2013).  
The information is still of interest for the other two cases, as it allows for a comparison of the 
semi-raw figures above to the prison population as a whole.  In Ireland, 12% of the prison 
population has yet to be sentenced, whereas 88% are serving their sentences; in the UK, for 
England and Wales, 9% are awaiting sentencing, while 87% are already sentenced, and for the 
UK Northern Ireland, 28% are awaiting sentencing while 72% have been sentenced (“Special 
data Collection on Persons held in Prisons (2010-2012)”, 2013).   The UK average, calculated 
from those numbers, is 18.5% awaiting trial and 79.5% already sentenced.  This makes Ireland 
seem slightly more efficient in terms of clearing cases; however, as the next sections will 
illustrate, this semblance of efficiency does not necessarily coincide with accuracy or justice. 
 Since the US laws will be looked at by state, it makes sense to include statistics for our 
two exemplar states, North Carolina and New York.  The North Carolina Court System provides 
extensive data on caseloads and case duration on its website.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
the duration of the cases will be compared, over time, for the statewide totals only.  As statewide 
totals are provided only for each separate level of court, those will be listed here and added 
together to calculate the true state totals, highlighted in blue.  The aim for including this data is to 
attain a numerical representation of the expediency of justice in the state, which is related to pre-
trial detention; it also provides some practical context for the discourse on caseload pressures.  
(The data will only cover “disposed” and “pending” cases to assess their “age;” as newly filed 
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cases have, as yet, no “age”.)  The case ages are separated into 9 increments in the data.  For the 
sake of integrity, those 9 increments are retained in these tables.  Since the data for the thousands 
of individual cases is not available, the exact median for the total rows cannot be calculated; 
thus, to approximate it, the average of the court medians is used, rounded to the nearest whole 
day.  Percentages for each case age category have also been calculated to make the data more 
meaningful and easier to digest and compare.  These are rounded to the nearest tenth.  Calculated 
figures are shaded in blue.  All North Carolina caseload and budget data is presented for the 
fiscal years of 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2014-2015.
  
 
TABLE 5 – NORTH CAROLINA STATEWIDE CASELOAD AND CASE AGES – FISCAL YEAR 2011-2012 
North Carolina Caseload Figures – Fiscal Year 2011-2012 
Court 
Case 
Status 
Total 
Cases 
0-30 
Days 
31-60 
Days 
61-90 
Days 
91-120 
Days 
121-
180 
Days 
181-
365 
Days 
366-
545 
Days 
546-
730 
Days 
731+ 
Days 
Med
-ian 
Days 
CVD Disposed 198,437 56,919 37,298 26,938 14,050 23,616 19,649 7,571 3,691 8,705 64 
CVD Pending 95,400 13,809 10,566 7,869 6,371 6,842 11,362 7,897 5,476 25,208 212 
CVM Disposed 227,925 202,306 14,049 2,783 6,245 908 1,433 108 49 44 14 
CVM Pending 14,264 11,145 1,012 618 144 133 363 216 114 519 10 
CVS Disposed 25,939 2,501 2,486 1,875 1,709 3,176 6,797 3,582 1,726 2,087 214 
CVS Pending 18,970 1,881 1,658 1,355 1,394 2,244 4,933 2,425 1,078 2,002 212 
E Disposed 68,149 36,537 838 899 2,348 3,764 6,663 5,912 2,484 8,704 0 
E Pending 66,321 2,432 2,307 2,278 2,304 4,079 8,788 6,415 3,951 33,767 760 
SP Disposed 67,462 8,890 6,055 5,859 7,490 10,487 14,784 6,440 3,399 4,058 148 
SP Pending 65,546 5,384 4,468 3,570 3,460 5,974 8,164 5,805 5,053 23,668 416 
Total Disposed 587,912 307,153 60,726 38,354 31,842 41,951 49,326 23,613 11,349 23,598 88 
Total Pending 260,501 34,651 20,011 15,690 13,673 19,272 33,610 22,758 15,672 85,164 322 
% Disposed 100 52.2 10.3 6.5 5.4 7.1 8.4 4.0 1.9 4.0  
% Pending 100 13.3 7.7 6.0 5.2 7.4 12.9 8.7 6.0 32.7  
Data (except totals and percentages) from: (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2011…”, 2012). 
 
The percentages bring to light a surprising fact about case lengths in North Carolina.  One would expect disposed cases to have 
higher ages, as they have already been through the process, and for the pending cases to have smaller ages, as they still have a ways to 
go before their resolution.  However, as the percentages show, 52.2% of the cases which were disposed in this fiscal year were 30 days 
old or less, whereas most of the pending cases, 32.7%, were in the highest age range of 731+ days, which is two years or more.  This 
means that, while most of the pending cases have been pending or continued for two years or more, the majority of new cases which 
2
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come in are heard and disposed within 30 days or less.  One of the factors which came to mind in identifying areas to study and 
compare for this research was the procedures for creating dockets, with the goal of suggesting policy changes to ensure older cases are 
heard first.  However, this had to be eliminated because there was no information available for the case study nations on docket 
creation procedures.  Still, this data here shows that newer cases are being disposed of quickly, while older cases are left pending.  
Was this a temporary anomaly, or a consistent trend?  The data for the rest of the fiscal years considered sheds some light on this. 
 
TABLE 6 – NORTH CAROLINA STATEWIDE CASELOAD AND CASE AGES – FISCAL YEAR 2012-2013 
North Carolina Caseload Figures – Fiscal Year 2012-2013 
Court 
Case 
Status 
Total 
Cases 
0-30 
Days 
31-60 
Days 
61-90 
Days 
91-120 
Days 
121-
180 
Days 
181-
365 
Days 
366-
545 
Days 
546-
730 
Days 
731+ 
Days 
Med-
ian 
Days 
CVD Disposed 188,237 53,519 34,870 25,089 14,048 23,734 19,760 6,568 3,397 7,252 65 
CVD Pending 92,137 11,838 9,825 6,880 5,124 6,920 11,526 7,850 4,856 27,318 258 
CVM Disposed 219,970 197,096 12,843 2,281 5,703 714 1,129 84 54 66 14 
CVM Pending 13,433 10,169 1,036 640 126 162 285 149 141 725 11 
CVS Disposed 24,002 2,363 2,196 1,707 1,613 2,845 6,398 3,586 1,595 1,699 216 
CVS Pending 16,712 1,574 1,493 1,433 1,125 1,974 3,889 2,054 1,199 1,971 209 
E Disposed 69,088 38,133 937 878 2,347 3,625 6,623 5,772 2,459 8,314 0 
E Pending 68,115 2,370 2,395 2,748 2,206 4,662 8,876 6,431 4,202 34,225 738 
SP Disposed 65,239 8,654 5,710 5,708 6,906 10,637 14,458 4,506 2,682 5,978 150 
SP Pending 67,409 4,686 4,200 4,669 3,111 5,615 11,285 5,628 3,397 24,818 368 
Total Disposed 566,536 299,765 56,556 35,663 30,617 41,555 48,368 20,516 10,187 23,309 89 
Total Pending 257,806 30,637 18,949 16,370 11,692 19,333 35,861 22,112 13,795 89,057 317 
% Disposed 100 52.9 10.0 6.3 5.4 7.3 8.5 3.6 1.8 4.1  
% Pending 100 11.9 7.4 6.3 4.5 7.5 13.9 8.6 5.4 34.5  
Data (except totals and percentages) from: (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2012…”, 2013).  
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TABLE 7 – NORTH CAROLINA STATEWIDE CASELOAD AND CASE AGES – FISCAL YEAR 2013-2014 
North Carolina Caseload Figures – Fiscal Year 2013-2014 
Court 
Case 
Status 
Total 
Cases 
0-30 
Days 
31-60 
Days 
61-90 
Days 
91-120 
Days 
121-
180 
Days 
181-
365 
Days 
366-
545 
Days 
546-
730 
Days 
731+ 
Days 
Med
-ian 
Days 
CVD Disposed 183,863 51,510 35,621 24,365 12,497 21,011 17,819 6,623 3,515 10,902 64 
CVD Pending 88,883 13,018 10,814 7,091 5,781 5,803 10,504 6,986 4,749 24,137 216 
CVM Disposed 219,502 196,600 12,978 2,092 5,991 623 1,072 70 28 48 13 
CVM Pending 14,714 11,219 1,126 607 124 132 229 193 141 943 11 
CVS Disposed 20,424 1,979 1,666 1,481 1,340 2,485 5,686 2,884 1,390 1,513 220 
CVS Pending 15,222 1,382 1,223 1,243 1,067 1,721 3,700 1,871 893 2,122 222 
E Disposed 68,426 37,347 967 953 2,315 3,738 6,883 5,960 2,393 7,870 0 
E Pending 71,016 2,411 2,555 2,602 2,518 4,163 9,374 6,969 4,298 36,126 757 
SP Disposed 65,024 8,241 5,486 5,476 6,164 9,456 15,089 6,107 2,792 6,213 163 
SP Pending 53,791 3,533 3,132 2,713 2,275 3,479 6,359 4,332 3,471 24,497 607 
Total Disposed 557,239 295,677 56,718 34,367 28,307 37,313 46,549 21,644 10,118 26,546 92 
Total Pending 243,626 31,563 18,850 14,256 11,765 15,298 30,166 20,351 13,552 87,825 363 
% Disposed 100 53.1 10.2 6.2 5.1 6.7 8.4 3.4 1.8 4.8  
% Pending 100 13.0 7.7 5.6 4.8 6.3 12.4 8.4 5.6 36.0  
Data (except totals and percentages) from: (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2013…”, 2014).  
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TABLE 8 – NORTH CAROLINA STATEWIDE CASELOAD AND CASE AGES – FISCAL YEAR 2014-2015 
North Carolina Caseload Figures – Fiscal Year 2014-2015 
Court 
Case 
Status 
Total 
Cases 
0-30 
Days 
31-60 
Days 
61-90 
Days 
91-120 
Days 
121-
180 
Days 
181-
365 
Days 
366-
545 
Days 
546-
730 
Days 
731+ 
Days 
Med
-ian 
Days 
CVD Disposed 183,630 51,281 36,630 25,104 12,784 22,899 17,893 5,752 2,928 8,359 63 
CVD Pending 91,897 13,689 9,851 7,400 6,032 5,978 11,549 6,828 4,710 25,860 222 
CVM Disposed 213,218 189,535 13,772 2,059 6,148 573 936 95 52 48 13 
CVM Pending 14,395 10,687 1,017 601 154 130 307 192 141 1,166 12 
CVS Disposed 17,956 1,951 1,438 1,217 1,165 2,193 5,010 2,563 1,181 1,238 218 
CVS Pending 14,752 1,323 1,166 1,171 1,077 1,558 3,442 1,727 964 2,324 228 
E Disposed 74,221 39,077 990 980 2,524 3,925 6,994 6,307 2,784 10,640 0 
E Pending 70,847 2,566 2,448 2,785 2,915 4,263 9,393 6,810 4,396 35,271 722 
SP Disposed 48,638 7,845 5,004 4,577 5,297 7,152 9,269 3,400 1,749 4,345 132 
SP Pending 50,527 3,377 2,627 2,627 2,153 3,139 5,647 3,167 2,379 25,411 741 
Total Disposed 537,663 289,689 57,834 33,937 27,918 36,742 40,102 18,117 8,694 24,630 85 
Total Pending 242,418 31,642 17,109 14,584 12,331 15,068 30,338 18,724 12,590 90,032 385 
% Disposed 100 53.9 10.8 6.3 5.2 6.8 7.5 3.4 1.6 4.6  
% Pending 100 13.1 7.1 6.0 5.1 6.2 12.5 7.7 5.2 37.1  
Data (except totals and percentages) from: (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2014…”, 2015).  
 
The data for the other fiscal years shows that, if anything, the observed trend has been getting stronger each year, 
resulting in ever more polarized case ages.  One potential explanation for the high number of cases processed in 30 days or less 
is plea bargaining.  If this is the case, then the increased polarization of the figures may be indicative of an increase in plea 
bargaining.  In the same data sets used for the figures above, one of the sub-categories for “disposed” cases is “Final 
Judgement No Trial;” these are the cases which were resolved with a plea bargain, or in case of civil trials, settled outside of
2
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court (as dismissals are listed separately).  Ideally, it would be informative to compare the length 
of time before the plea bargain (“age” of case in the data) with the outcome; however, the 
outcomes are not included in the data.  What can be calculated from the data, however, is the 
percentage of disposed cases that were settled without a trial.  These are calculated in the table 
below. 
 
TABLE 9 – NORTH CAROLINA “FINAL JUDGEMENT NO TRIAL” CASE TOTALS AND 
PERCENTAGES 
“Final Judgement No Trial” Case Totals and Percentages 
Court 2011-2012
1
 2012-2013
2
 2013-2014
3
 2014-2015
4
 
CVD 46,081 43,352 43,967 42,612 
CVM 142 244 432 412 
CVS 3,398 3,131 2,775 2,486 
E 6 13 9 7 
SP 118 134 115 92 
Total Pleas 49,745 46,874 47,298 45,609 
Total Disposed* 587,912 566,536 557,239 537,663 
% of disposed cases 
which are pleas 
8.5 8.3 8.5 8.5 
*Calculated in the previous tables 
1 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2011…”, 2012). 
2 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2012…”, 2013). 
3 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2013…”, 2014). 
4 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2014…”, 2015). 
 
Since there was no key provided for the court abbreviations, one can only speculate as to 
which courts they are.  Although it wasn’t apparent from the figures for the ages of the cases, the 
large number of cases settled out of court seems to support the notion that the three categories 
beginning with “cv” are Civil – District Court, Civil – Magistrate, and Civil – Superior Court.  If 
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this is the case, then these are most likely settlements and are irrelevant to this research.  This is 
not a certainty, so they were reported in this table as presented in the data; however, given this 
possibility, the data for “Final Judgement No Trial” are presented again below, without the first 
three courts (the total disposed is also presented below minus those three courts for accuracy of 
the percentage calculation). 
 
TABLE 10 – NORTH CAROLINA “FINAL JUDGEMENT NO TRIAL” E AND SP ONLY 
“Final Judgement No Trial” Case Totals and Percentages – E and SP only 
Court 2011-2012
1
 2012-2013
2
 2013-2014
3
 2014-2015
4
 
E 6 13 9 7 
SP 118 134 115 92 
Total Pleas 124 147 124 99 
Total Disposed E &SP 
only 
135,611 134,327 133,450 122,859 
% of disposed cases 
which are pleas 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2011…”, 2012). 
2 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2012…”, 2013). 
3 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2013…”, 2014). 
4 (“Caseload Activity Reports – Fiscal Year 2014…”, 2015). 
 
While the complete statistics in the previous table show that only 8.5% of cases are 
settled without trial, if the CV ones are indeed civil suits, then that leaves only 0.1% of criminal 
cases to plea bargaining.  This does not mean that pleas and settlements are not the cause behind 
the polarized data, as the largest number of cases resolved in 30 days or less, in the previous 
tables, was in the CV courts.  It may be worth noting that there is also no indication what “E” 
stands for, but given the fact that, despite a similar variety of case ages to the other courts, its 
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median age is always reported as zero, one is inclined to believe it is a special circumstance; it 
may just mean that, given that the largest category for the group was 0 to 30 days, 0 was the most 
common duration.  However, not knowing whether “E” is criminal or civil, the strange reporting 
of the median age does not affect the inclusion of it in cases settled out of court.  It may also do 
to consider that “SP” might stand for Superior Court (Which raises the question of why, in 
thousands of records, there was no statewide data for District Court).  Either way, this data on 
case ages must be considered in conjunction with budgetary data to see if there are any 
noticeable correlations. 
For this table, the “certified budget” is used for comparison rather than the 
“expenditures” fund amount, as the former is what is actually allotted for use and shows the 
yearly changes, whereas the fund total is around $460 million for all of the years listed, with an 
average percent change of +0.435% (“North Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2015, p.3).  The 
fiscal years studied were chosen to match those examined in the caseload statistics, however, it is 
interesting to note that, in the four fiscal years preceding those detailed below, the 
“expenditures” fund saw a 13.81 percent surge, followed by modest raises, and then a 6.63 
percent drop to the $460 million +/- 8 million mark at which it has so far stabilized (“North 
Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2012, p.3).  As previously stated, although the amount in the fund 
has not varied much in the years studied, the amount of such which was actually approved for 
spending by the General Assembly has.  Those figures, along with key sub figures which were 
considered for the other nations, are in the table below.  North Carolina’s court budget report 
does not show data per capita, nor per case, but simply in whole dollar amounts.   Additionally, 
these figures do not include spending for Defense, only for Prosecution. 
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TABLE 11 – NORTH CAROLINA COURTS BUDGET 
North Carolina Courts Budget 
Fiscal Year Certified Budget 
Percent Change 
from Previous 
Year 
Percent of total 
State Agencies 
Budget 
District Attorney 
Offices Spending 
DA Percent of 
Certified Budget  
2011-2012
1
 $438,920,048 -2.53 2.23 $89,756,274 20.45 
2012-2013
2
 $432,806,800 -1.39 2.14 $91,851,614 21.22 
2013-2014
3
 $456,926,252 5.57 2.21 $93,884,897 20.55 
2014-2015
4
 $463,893,072 1.52 2.20 $95,911,111 20.68 
Average $448,136,543 0.79 2.19 $92,850,974 20.72* 
*if calculated from the Average row, this figure rounds up to 20.72, but if calculated from its 
column, which are already rounded figures, it rounds up to 20.73.  The 20.72 was used so that no 
figure involves more than one rounding. 
1  (“North Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2012, p.3-4). 
2  (“North Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2013, p.3-4). 
3  (“North Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2014, p.3-4). 
4  (“North Carolina Courts Statistical…”, 2015, p.3-4). 
 
 This budget table highlights a few key facts.  Although the court system budget has seen 
a marginal increase of less than 1% per year on average, its percentage of the total state budget 
has been fairly constant, meaning that the slight increase in funding is a result of increased 
funding for the state overall.  Since there was no data included for the budget for defense 
council, the proportions cannot be compared.  However, it is notable that, even in years when the 
overall court system budget was reduced, the budget for District Attorneys’ offices has been on a 
steady rise of $2 million per year, although these increases have also coincided with a relative 
constant percentage of the total courts budget.   
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 New York, unfortunately, does not have a statewide caseload statistics database available.  
The only caseload statistics it provides are for New York City from 2011, along with the number 
of judges employed, from which caseload per judge can be calculated. 
 
TABLE 12 – NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 2011 
New York City Criminal Court Caseload Statistics 2011 Judges = 107 
 On-line Arrests Summonses Total Caseload per Judge* 
Filings 357,842 528,618 886,460 8,285 
Dispositions 355,614 331,847 687,461 6,425 
Total Cases 713,456 860,465 1,573,921 14,710 
*rounded to nearest whole number 
Data from: (“New York City Criminal Court…”, 2012). 
 
Consider the implications of this data.  This means that each judge in New York City 
presided over the conclusion of 6,425 cases in 2011.  Although not every day is a working day, if 
you were to divide this by 365 days, that would amount to 17.6 cases heard per judge, per day.  
Which, assuming an 8-hour workday in court, would leave only 27.27 minutes per case.  It is 
clear that the sheer volume of cases renders trying all of them practically impossible.  It is worse 
when you consider the fact that more new cases are filed each year than are completed.   
How does North Carolina compare in this regard?  Although the caseload statistics 
database did not include caseloads per judge, a fact sheet released by the North Carolina Court 
System from fiscal year 2014-2015 does list the number of cases and number of judges for 
District and Superior court, from which this can be calculated. 
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TABLE 13 – NORTH CAROLINA CASELOADS PER JUDGE 
 Cases filed 
Cases 
disposed 
Total cases 
Number 
of Judges 
Cases filed 
per judge 
Cases disposed per 
judge 
Overall 
caseload per 
judge 
District 
Court 
2,407,195 2,588,957 4,996,152 270 8,916 9,589 18,504 
Superior 
Court 
262,825 296,219 559,044 112 2,347 2,645 4,991 
Total 2,670,020 2,885,176 5,555,196 382 6,990 7,553 14,542 
     
Rounded to nearest whole number; total row 
calculated from case and judge totals, not added or 
averaged from the rows above 
Data from: (“Judicial Branch Fact Sheet,” 2015, p.2). 
 
Based upon these numbers, North Carolina judges have an even larger average caseload than 
those in New York City.  Thus, it is no wonder that plea bargaining is a default tactic for clearing 
the cases; this is, of course, the explanation for how each judge can dispose of 6 to 9 thousand 
cases annually.  It stands to reason that this high caseload is a major contributor to the lengthy 
pre-trial detentions in the city, which were alluded to in the introduction.  It would be very 
interesting to see case age statistics for New York like those provided for North Carolina, even if 
only for New York City.  However, these are currently not available. 
 In keeping with its limited availability of data, New York only has the court system 
budget for the upcoming fiscal year available; at least, it is statewide and thus comparable to the 
North Carolina figures.  The budget document also includes the 2015-2016 figures for 
comparison.  Interestingly, unlike North Carolina, this data includes legal aid, but does not 
specify the allocation for prosecution. It does, however, include funding for grievances against 
attorney malpractice.  The fact that this is a budget allocation specified in the report may be a 
reflection of the scope of the problem.  Although many cases of prosecutorial misconduct go 
unchallenged, the report does provide figures on the number of “Attorney Discipline” cases 
which came before New York’s appeals courts in 2014; there were a total of 14,327 new cases 
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and 12,891 disposed cases (“Fiscal Year 2016-2017 Budget,” 2016, p.137).  Although this is a 
reflection of the underlying cultural problems, it is still a positive, reformist, sign that such 
matters are considered important enough to be duly addressed in the budget. 
 
TABLE 14 – NEW YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM BUDGET DATA 
New York State Court System Budget 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total
1
 
Indigent 
Legal 
Services
1
 
ILS 
Percent 
of total 
Attorney 
Discipline 
Program
2
 
ADP 
Percent 
of total 
2015-
2016 
$2,084,272,038 $25,000,000 1.2   
2016-
2017 
$2,132,526,345 $25,000,000 1.2 $14,900,000 0.7 
1 (“Fiscal Year 2016…”, 2016, p.15).  
2 (“Fiscal Year 2016…”, 2016, p.156).  
 
Although this budget information is far from comprehensive, it does include a key figure.  
The Indigent legal services budget has a flat allowance of only 1.2 percent of the court system 
budget.  Of course, administrative costs are a large proportion of any court system’s budget, 
however, that generally leaves behind more than 1.2 percent each for defense and prosecution.  If 
North Carolina is of any comparison, it consistently budgets between 20 and 21 percent of its 
court system funding for the District attorneys’ offices.  It would stand to reason that the Indigent 
Legal services office would receive something in the same range of funding.  Although neither 
state provided funding data for both sides of the aisle, that which they did provide speaks 
volumes for a legal system whose culture values conviction rates approximately 20 times more 
than providing for a fair and level playing field.  Low budget allocations put a serious strain on a 
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system that is already drowning in backlogs.  As the preceding literature discourse suggests, this 
strain exacerbates the situation for all of the factors studied.  Bearing these systemic constraints 
in mind, the legislation and practices of the three countries will be compared to identify 
differences which may help or hinder due process in the target areas. 
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ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE 
 
In this section, relevant legislation will be examined and compared to identify differences 
which may be affecting the outcomes of the system.  For the US laws, the idea was to pick a 
reformist state and a non-reformist state to enhance the comparative analysis.  However, in 
reality, they are not so clearly distinguished.  The two states were chosen for the ways in which 
they stand out in terms of the results of their systems.  Although one leans more towards reform, 
it could be argued that it has a longer way to go from its starting point, whereas the other, while 
having a better starting position, is not so actively seeking to reform, nor is it even addressing 
some of the issues at hand.  New York is an excellent state to examine if only for the infamy of 
Riker’s Island, as noted in the introduction.  However, it is actually the reformist example, as it 
has also implemented legal reforms in recent years to address its short-comings.  North Carolina 
is our non-reformist example, since the only reform efforts are federal, and that there does not 
seem to be legislation in this state which mentions and inmate’s right to legal representation 
while incarcerated.  The subsections for North Carolina, the UK, New York, and Ireland are 
presented in that order so that, rather than discuss the US at length all at once, it is easier to draw 
more side by side comparisons between the states and the other two countries.  The laws 
examined for these two US states, the UK, and Ireland will be those pertaining to bail (for 
pretrial detention) and those pertaining to access to legal representation while incarcerated 
(where such legislation exists). 
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North Carolina 
First, let’s examine the North Carolina laws pertaining to Bail and Pretrial release.  The 
law begins by establishing the general guidelines.  Defendants who were involuntarily 
committed either before or after the crime do not have a right to pretrial release and are simply 
sent back their respective institutions (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  As they are not 
incarcerated while awaiting trial, for the purposes of this thesis, this counts as release.  In all 
other “noncapital” cases, a judge must set “conditions of pretrial release;” defendants in capital 
trials can also be released by a judge, although there are more restrictions on their terms of 
release (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).     
The Criminal Procedure Act also lists conditions which, when satisfied, result in “a 
rebuttable presumption” that the only way to make sure the defendant will be present for his or 
her trial is to keep him or her detained; in other words, the statute lists situations in which a 
defendant, by default, will not be released on bail (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  The 
conditions which trigger this guilty-until-proven-innocent perspective are as follows: If the 
offense involved Drug trafficking, Gangs, or Illegal firearms; occurred while the defendant was 
out on bail for a different case; or the defendant has been convicted of a similar offense, or, in 
the case of the firearms, completed a sentence for a similar offense within the past five years 
(Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  Although these conditions contribute to a flight or safety 
risk, a judge can still decide to release such defendants on bond if he or she is a low flight risk 
and is not an “unreasonable risk” to society; however if the offense occurred while the defendant 
was already on pretrial release for another crime, then a secured bond of “at least double” the 
most recent bond amount is required, or a minimum $1,000 bond if there was none for the 
previous offense (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  
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 The law also outlines the requirements for and “conditions of pretrial release” (Criminal 
Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  At least one of the five listed conditions is required to be part of a 
defendant’s release; these conditions are: a written promise to appear; an unsecured bond; in the 
custody of a specified individual or “organization”; a bond secured by either cash or another 
“solvent” asset; or house arrest with electronic monitoring (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  
The first three conditions are the default conditions for pretrial release; the last two are to be used 
only if the judge determines that the unsecured options to be insufficient insurance of the 
defendant’s return for trial (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  A secured bond is required for 
those released on house arrest, and optional for those released into another’s custody (Criminal 
Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  A judge can also impose restrictions on various aspects of a 
defendant’s life and actions during pre-trial release.  These can include whereabouts and 
associations of the defendant as well as on “alcohol consumption” (Criminal Procedure Act: 
Bail, 2013).   
 According to the statute, the factors which a judge must consider in order to determine 
the conditions for release are as follows: the type of charge and its specific “circumstances”; the 
available “evidence”; and factors which could contribute to or detract from flight risk, such as 
connections to “family”, job, “financial” means, and his or her “character, and mental 
condition”; intoxication to the extent that the defendant is dangerous to himself or others; how 
long the defendant has lived in his or her current residence; his or her criminal record; if the 
defendant has historically been a flight risk or failed to appear; and any additional relevant 
information (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  A Magistrate or Clerk of Court can amend 
pretrial release conditions before the defendant’s trial begins, and a judge can change the terms at 
any time provided there is “good cause” (Criminal Procedure Act: Bail, 2013).  A defendant can 
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also be spontaneously detained for up to twenty-four hours for testing purposes if there is 
reasonable suspicion that he or she may have AIDS or Hepatitis B and was involved in an 
“nonsexual” incident which may have exposed someone to a disease (Criminal Procedure Act: 
Bail, 2013).  No existing North Carolina statutes were found in this research to explicitly address 
the right to legal representation for the incarcerated after sentencing; however, the state 
legislature recently addressed this issue by acting in a way which acknowledges the lack of such 
a legal guarantee.   
 In 2013, the North Carolina state senate’s budget, “SB 402,” sought to defund the “North 
Carolina Prisoner Legal Services (NCPLS)” (Doran, 2013), a non-profit contracted through “the 
Office of Indigent Services” (North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, 2015) of the “Department 
of Corrections…to provide legal services” for the incarcerated (Doran, 2013).  Although the 
constitution does not specifically state that prisoners have the “right to counsel,” the sixth 
amendment, which outlines the right to counsel for “all criminal prosecutions” and direct appeals 
thereof, provides a basis on which to argue to intended or implied right to legal aid while in the 
system (Doran, 2013).  There are also several Supreme Court cases which have set a precedent 
for this right of prisoners to have “access to the courts” (Doran, 2013).  Although the North 
Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law names several, such as Ryland V. Shapiro, an in-depth 
description of the relevant case law is beyond the scope of this analysis.  Suffice it to say that the 
North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services themselves cite “Bounds V. Smith” as the basis for this 
right (2015).  The idea that prisoners have a constitutional right to legal services also stems from 
the “First Amendment right ‘to petition the Government for redress of grievances” (Doran, 
2013).   This particular budget cut did not pass in 2013 (North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, 
2015).  Prisoners in North Carolina still have access to these legal services, but it is held together 
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by a vague constitutional thread, with no protection, and in fact, with threats on the state level.  
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has passed reform legislation which expand the rights 
of the accused, to a certain extent. 
 
United Kingdom 
 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 made several 
changes to the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.  Ideally, it may be enlightening to compare the 2003 
act procedures with the new ones, to determine if this was a change in the right or the wrong 
direction in terms of prisoners’ rights; however, due to the limited scope of this project and the 
variety of evidence to examine, this analysis will only use the current situation, the 2012 act’s 
provisions, and compare them to the other nations in question, with the focus on future progress.   
 Section 13 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 
provides starting “advice and assistance” for those in police “custody” (Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  Section 15 states that legal assistance is available 
to those who are under criminal investigations, those who are already in court, and those who 
have been on trial (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  These 
two provisions seem to contradict each other on whether those in police custody have the right to 
legal assistance or not.  Section 16 further confuses this issue by saying that those who qualify 
for representation also have access to such for “bail proceedings” with regards to that case, 
including “preliminary or incidental” hearings (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  However, section 16 also states that regulations can be made to 
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establish “exceptions for proceedings” occurring more than a specified length of time before or 
after the main trial (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012). 
 According to section 17 of the act, in determining whether someone is eligible for legal 
aid, in addition to “financial resources,” one must consider the risk to the individual’s “liberty,” 
“livelihood,” or “reputation” posed by a conviction, the potential for a defining case law, the 
individual’s ability to represent his or herself, and whether there will be other witnesses to 
question (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  According to 
sections 18 and 19 of the act, these determinations can be made by a director or by the court 
(Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  Section 20 of the act 
states that a preliminary assessment of a suspect’s eligibility for legal aid can be made during an 
initial investigation, preceding the criminal charges (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012, 2012). 
 Section 108 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 
serves as an amendment of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003; completely replacing the 
procedures for counting time in custody or pretrial detention “towards time served” (Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  The new act states that the days that 
a defendant was in custody count towards the reduction of his or her sentence, with a few 
stipulations (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  If the 
offender was in custody for more than one offense, each day counts only once, towards one 
offense; additionally, a day cannot count towards the twenty-eight days “before automatic 
release” (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  To define 
automatic release, the law refers the reader to section 255 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 
which explains that automatic release occurs twenty-eight days after one “return[s] to prison,” “if 
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the Secretary of State” deems him or her to be a low risk (Criminal Justice Act of 2003, 2003).  
According to section 255B, this process can be initiated at any time after the prisoner’s return to 
prison (Criminal Justice Act of 2003, 2003).  This seems to clarify that the 28 day exception for 
counting time served applies only to prisoners who have been deemed suitable for, and 
scheduled for, automatic release.   
 In a more positive measure, Section 109 allows for a portion of the time which one was 
out on bail to also count towards the reduction of one’s sentence; the formula for calculating this 
portion was also amended from the 2003 act to the 2012 act (Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  The new method of calculation is as follows: add up 
all of the days when the offender was under the bail restrictions, including the first day even if it 
is a partial day, but excluding the last day if the end of it was already spent in custody (as this 
would already count in the previous section), then subtract any days on which the only 
restrictions were a curfew or none at all, then subtract the number of days (if any) where the 
defendant violated the terms of bail, divide the remaining days by 2, and “round up to the nearest 
whole number” if necessary (Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 
2012).  Like the pretrial detention days, a day of bail restrictions counts only once towards one 
sentence and cannot count as one of the last 28 days of a sentence (Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).  The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act of 2012 also, in Schedule (appendix) 11, contained amendments to the Bail Act of 
1976; the majority of these were simply clarifications of terminology, such as changing “’a child 
or young person’” to “a person under the age of seventeen”(Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 2012).   
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 In comparison to the American versions, the British Bail Act of 1976 is very thorough 
and specific in its delineation of the circumstances, terms and procedures surrounding every 
conceivable aspect of the bail process (Bail Act 1976, 1976).  It states that, in general, a person 
who is released on bail can either be released on his or her own recognizance, on unsecured 
bond, or secured bond, with the requirements that he or she “does not commit” a crime, does not 
“obstruct…justice” in any case, is available for questioning, and meets with an attorney (Bail Act 
1976, 1976).  In “murder” trials, a defendant must be mentally evaluated by two physicians 
before being eligible for release (Bail Act 1976, 1976).  This is strikingly different from the 
American laws, which generally prohibit the release of such defendants, but leave it open to the 
discretion of the judge.  This is somewhat of a confounding variable to this analysis, because, 
this provision is more likely to extend the length of a defendant’s pretrial detention, however, 
this safeguard arguably produces a more protective result for society.  Though it may be a 
positive measure, it would have a negative effect in terms of the numbers in question.  This just 
goes to highlight how different situations necessitate different regulations.  Such a regulation 
makes sense as a precaution for murder trials, but that does not detract from the overall problem, 
of some defendants waiting years to be tried and found innocent.  There are many more factors at 
play in the legislation than can be directly attributed or applied to the problems at hand.  While 
some of the identified differences are more clearly beneficial to the reduction of pretrial 
detention, others come with more baggage.  Examining the intricacies of all such provisions is a 
subject which necessitates further study.   
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New York 
 The New York law regarding bail is far simpler, and shorter than its counterparts.  In a 
mere two pages, the New York Criminal Procedure Law simply states that the factors to consider 
in the decision whether or not to grant bail are the defendant’s “character,” mental stability; job 
and finances; family relationships; length of time lived in current “community”; and “criminal 
record;” as well as his juvenile record and any history of flight risk (Application for 
recognizance or bail…, 2013).  Whether or not the defendant owns or has used a gun is also on 
the list (Application for recognizance or bail…, 2013).  Additional factors to consider include 
whether the crime was committed against a member of the defendant’s household, whether he or 
she violated a restraining order, the available evidence, the potential sentence for the charge, and, 
in cases of appeal, the likelihood that the judgement would be reversed (Application for 
recognizance or bail…, 2013).  The statute detailing these factors to consider referred back to 
statute 530.10 as containing the definitions for situations which allow bail; however, statute 
530.10 simply states that a trial in a court, with a judge, is the venue in which bail comes into 
question (Order of Recognizance or Bail; in General, n.d.).  Thus, the stipulations listed above 
are the only ones officially in the New York law.  This is surprising given the detail in the North 
Carolina law, and the even greater detail in its European counterparts.  Perhaps having only a list 
of factors as a guideline explains the pretrial detention crisis on Riker’s Island.   
Although we have examined the laws for both of the example states, there is a federal law 
pertaining to bail as well, for defendants awaiting a trial for a federal offense.  The U.S. federal 
law pertaining to bail states that a person can be released on his or her own recognizance, 
unsecured bond, or simply detained (Release or detention of a defendant pending trial, 2008).  
Other than adding the word “federal” to stipulations such as the defendant cannot commit a 
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crime while out on bail, and a few added lines about collecting DNA evidence, the U.S. law is 
not materially different from those previously detailed.  It is more in-depth than the state laws, 
containing procedural requirements for a variety of specific circumstances, but not as extensive 
as the European laws.  Rather than re-iterate the principles established in the two states’ laws, it 
is more important to now examine the reform efforts conducted in the reform example state of 
New York in the next section; but first, Ireland’s laws and practices must be examined as well. 
 
Ireland 
Of the countries and states in this analysis, Ireland has the direst need of reform, and the 
least likelihood of passing it any time soon.  As there is not much material difference between 
the bail laws, the Irish part of this analysis will focus on the access to legal representation for the 
incarcerated, as this is where the country excels at denying rights.  There are many barriers to 
legal aid for the incarcerated in Ireland; a University of Cincinnati Law Review article, 
Langwallner, about the Irish Innocence Project organization details the hurdles with which Irish 
law prevents it from assisting them.   
Ireland, although much more fraught with systemic barriers to exoneration, has an 
Innocence Project organization, which has been operating since 2009 (Langwallner, 2013, 
p.1293).  The presence of the organization, however, does not mean that Irish inmates have 
reasonable access to legal aid.  There are a multitude of aspects of Irish criminal law which 
directly bar organizations such as the Innocence Project from providing legal assistance, not the 
least of which are preventing them from accessing the trial records and evidence (which the 
police are not even required to keep after the trial is over), communicating with the defendant 
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directly, getting the original attorney to cooperate, and crucially, from requesting a retesting of 
DNA evidence (Langwallner, 2013, p.1297-1298 & 1311).  The organization had to meet with 
the Minister of Justice and get permission from the bar association to allow its attorneys to enter 
the prisons to speak to clients; however, the attorney who speaks to the client cannot be the same 
one who represents him or her in court (Langwallner, 2013, p.1299).  In addition to actual legal 
barriers, there are also variables at the level of individual officials in the system; despite having 
express permission to meet with clients in prisons, the organization has faced difficulties with 
individual officers not letting them enter the prisons (Langwallner, 2013, p.1300).   
Some legislation directly prohibits these actions, while other legislation sets the threshold 
of proof to make a case so high that it is nearly impossible to get DNA evidence tested without 
having something as strong as DNA evidence to support the claim of a “miscarriage of justice” 
(Langwallner, 2013, p.1300).  The laws preventing prisoners from seeking legal aid in Ireland, 
primarily in the “Criminal Procedure Act” are extensive (Langwallner, 2013, p.1300).  
According to the Irish Criminal Procedure Act, in order to file a miscarriage of justice, there 
must be new evidence already available; it is then up to the court to either uphold or overturn the 
conviction, or order a new trial (Langwallner, 2013, p.1301).  Even if there is new evidence in 
the defendant’s favor, his or her conviction may still be upheld if the court does not think that 
there was a “miscarriage of justice;” such a decision can, however, be taken to the supreme court 
(Langwallner, 2013, p.1302-1303).  To prove that there has been a miscarriage of justice requires 
factual innocence, but can also apply if the evidence was not “credible,” procedures were not 
followed, or the defense counsel was inadequate (Langwallner, 2013, p.1304-1305).  To address 
that last point, however, Irish case law has yet to set a guideline for measuring the effectiveness 
of legal counsel (Langwallner, 2013, p.1329).  In 2003, the European Convention on Human 
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Rights was incorporated into Irish law, but it was established as below the national constitution, 
meaning the Irish constitutional law, which imposes some of the aforementioned restrictions, 
supersedes the Human Rights laws; the Irish government also stipulated that the convention was 
not retroactive, and would thus not apply to the trials of those who are already convicted 
(Langwallner, 2013, p.1306).   
In addition to having no legal basis requiring the preservation of evidence after a trial 
ends, Ireland has no DNA database, and its legislature had just rejected a bill to establish one, 
which was the “Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) bill” 
(Langwallner, 2013, p.1311).  Although it sought to create a database, it did not include a 
provision for keeping the evidence from crime scenes, despite the scholarly reports on which the 
bill was based having recommended exactly that for the purpose of proving miscarriages of 
justice (Langwallner, 2013, p.1311).  As previously mentioned, there is no express right in U.S. 
laws for post-conviction legal representation or evidence testing, but it is viewed as being an 
implicit element of due process (Langwallner, 2013, p.1312).   
 Irish case law, rather than expanding rights as it does in the US and UK, has hindered 
defendants’ ability to plea their cases, by requiring them to answer incriminating questions which 
are “admissible” in court (Langwallner, 2013, p.1314).  Case law has also weakened the right to 
an attorney, establishing that they are not required to be present for police questioning, and that it 
is perfectly constitutional for questioning to continue while waiting for the attorney 
(Langwallner, 2013, p.1316).  Irish case law has rendered inadmissible any evidence gathered 
through “a deliberate breach of constitutional right[s],” such as a marathon interrogation with no 
sleep (Langwallner, 2013, p.1317-1318).  However, while these techniques are now 
unconstitutional, there is also no law or case law which adequately addresses the issue of 
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wrongful convictions resulting from “false confessions” (Langwallner, 2013, p.1329).  The right 
to an interpreter for those who do not speak the language is also unclear; case law has ruled that 
it exists, but has simultaneously declared that, despite not having met this right, this was not a 
violation in the case in question (Langwallner, 2013, p.1320).  It is not a very strong right if not 
meeting it is not a violation.   
So as not to conclude this section on such a sour note, the Irish Penal Reform Trust, an 
NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) researching and advocating for criminal justice reform 
in Ireland, reported recently on “barriers to accessing justice,” and made recommendations for 
both the legislative side and the practice side of the issue (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012, p.1).  
It opened with this heartening declaration: “The right of access to the courts and to have 
grievances and complaints by prisoners dealt with effectively, transparently and efficiently are 
essential elements in the creation of a legitimate and fair prison regime” (Irish Penal Reform 
Trust, 2012 p.1).  The IRPT has recommended an “ombudsman”-like independent authority for 
prisoners to launch complaints, as “there is [currently] no independent” agency available to hear 
inmates’ grievances and enforce changes, and the system which is currently in place does not 
meet “international human rights standards” (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.1).  There should 
also be protections against negative consequences of filing a complaint (Irish Penal Reform 
Trust, 2012 p.1). 
The 2010 Irish High Court case “Mulligan V Governor of Portlaoise Prison & Anor” 
reaffirmed the courts’ stance that the prisoner has to prove that the authorities had malicious 
intent in order to claim a breach of human rights (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.1).  This is a 
preventative burden of proof, as rights violations are more likely to be a result of budget 
shortages or lack of recourse for the “conditions” in question (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 
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p.1).  Although this standard of proof remains in place, there have, however, been individual 
cases which acknowledged that there was a breach of rights without proof of malice, such as 
“Kinsella v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison” (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.1).    
As explained in Langwallner, Ireland does not have legal aid for prisoners as the UK 
does; in fact, they are not even required to provide such for “parole hearings” (Irish Penal 
Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).  Cost issues may be a major contributing factor for Ireland’s 
comparatively under-developed “prison law jurisprudence” (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).  
Additionally, “the lack of legal aid for prisoners” for cases relating to their conditions in prison, 
along with the lack of a complaints system, could allow a court to rule that inmates in Ireland 
have no recourse against human rights violations (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).  To 
ameliorate these problems, the Irish government could provide basic legal aid to litigate breaches 
of human rights (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).  The IPRT suggests that such a system 
should include the coverage of one visit by counsel after conviction and sentencing, to help 
ensure that the prisoners are not mistreated and know their rights while incarcerated (Irish Penal 
Reform Trust, 2012 p.2). Many Irish prisons also restrict the times of day during which inmates 
can make phone calls; these hours are often when lawyers are in court (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 
2012 p.2).   Additionally, prison authorities are opening and reading communications between 
prisoners and solicitors, which is illegal, but complaints are not often investigated or heeded 
(Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).  Moreover, the high possibility of “costs being awarded 
against an NGO” deters them from representing prisoners in human rights trials (Irish Penal 
Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).    IPRT suggests that the Irish government could remedy this by 
passing a law to make it easier for an NGO to initiate court proceedings for prisoners, as well as 
to allow them to form class action suits, which would ultimately save time and money (Irish 
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Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.2).    However, of utmost importance is that the prisoners have 
access to information “about their rights,” or else Ireland is violating “article 3” of the “European 
Court of Human Rights” (Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2012 p.3).    A proper reform to address this 
would require prison authorities to make prisoners “fully aware” of their rights, providing the 
information with concessions for those with learning and/or physical disabilities (Irish Penal 
Reform Trust, 2012 p.3).  Although the Irish government rejected a bill to even keep a DNA 
database, there are multiple NGOs working to improve the system.   
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CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR REFORMS 
 
As previously discussed, to believe that simply increasing budgets would solve the 
problem is to fall prey to the legal man assumption.  While it certainly wouldn’t hurt, and has 
been shown to help in some cases, increased funding cannot solve the problems alone.  As the 
reference to the legal man assumption implies, increased budgets must be combined with serious 
changes in the culture of the legal system to value justice over convictions, clearing rates, and 
other factors.  Similarly, changing the motivations of the actors would also not be enough, by 
itself, to fix the system.  Even with the best intentions in place, a lack of resources could still 
prevent them being realized.  Ireland, having both the smallest court budget and the most 
regressive laws clearly needs change from both directions.  Change, however, has thus far been 
impeded by its regressive political culture.  Political culture, in and of itself, cannot stand alone 
as an explanation for “social conduct,” but “an informed political observer” can use knowledge 
of a particular political culture to infer “the likely and the unlikely consequences of political 
actions” (Welch, 2013, p.1).  Ireland’s political culture is opposed to admitting mistakes or 
providing assistance in any form to the incarcerated, and officers have been known to hinder 
perfectly legal assistance requests of inmates.  Knowing this, one can infer that, even if the 
proposed Irish reforms pass the second time around, it will be a long time before the 
implementation catches up. 
There is room for improvement in all three of the countries in both pre-trial detention 
time and legal representation for the convicted.  All of the factors considered were shown to 
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contribute to these shortcomings in varying degrees.  Overall, Ireland, having the worst track 
record, has the most deeply-rooted problem, not only in the implementation of its laws, but also 
in the laws themselves, which are structured to meet human rights standards only technically.  
Ireland’s low budget allocations certainly do not help matters, but that takes a backseat to what 
the country’s law enforcement and legal arms are actually doing with the resources they have, 
which is limiting recourse for any “miscarriage of justice”.  The United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, spends twice as much per capita on its judicial system than Ireland, and has more 
progressive bail laws, surpassing the U.S. on most legislative fronts.  However, these are also the 
areas in which it can improve, in terms of the direction it is heading.  The conclusions for the 
individual countries below expand upon this point.  The U.S. is squarely in the middle.  In terms 
of bail legislation, it is neither progressive nor repressive, but simply straight forward.  In terms 
of budgets, however, there is plenty of room for improvement within its court systems.  Although 
neither New York nor North Carolina was bold enough to make both its prosecution and defense 
budgets available for side by side comparison, they each happened to choose the opposite one to 
display.  All else being equal, with North Carolina being surprisingly worse in terms of 
caseloads, and New York being the one to take steps to relieve that pressure, it is important to 
note that this alone is not enough.  It seems likely that the District Attorney’s budget is as much 
as twenty times that of the Indigent Defense budget.  Until these numbers are balanced out 
enough for the states to be comfortable reporting both figures, the public defenders offices will 
continue to experience the strain of caseload pressures, even if the courtrooms do not.  That 
would merely put the defendants at a further disadvantage.  This is why any reform efforts must 
be well rounded, tackling the issues from different angles, in order to succeed. 
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In examining all of the evidence presented, it seems clear that a combination of both a 
change in budgeting and a change in the social-cultural atmosphere of the legal and law 
enforcement professions would be necessary in order to address the problems of extensive 
pretrial detention and aggressive pressure for guilty pleas, factors which interact to increase the 
risk of imprisoning innocents.  Although reform laws can be passed, if the culture of 
implementation does not change along with them, some of the effect may be negated.  The 
literature and the data suggest that resource scarcity may serve as an enabler for the culture of 
measuring success by convictions. Although there is no way to be certain how many people have 
been wrongfully convicted as a result of these short-comings, the other side of the coin is access 
to legal representation while incarcerated.  Although there are not specific laws outlining the 
right to legal aid for prisoners, it is generally accepted as an implied right as part of due process 
that: if there is a new hearing with new evidence in a sentenced case, this falls under the 
provisions for counsel for criminal legal proceedings.  Of the three nations examined, only 
Ireland has laws and practices which work to expressly prevent prisoners from receiving legal 
aid. 
As mentioned in the previous section, although North Carolina is not our example of a 
reform state, and its legislature did attempt to pass a bill denying prisoners legal representation, 
at least this reform did not pass.  The previous section also already mentioned Ireland’s attempt 
to reform minimally, by adding a DNA database to their justice system; however, even this did 
not pass.  Given the minimal budgets recorded in the data at the beginning of this thesis, it is 
possible that Ireland’s failure to pass this reform was, at least in part, motivated by a desire to 
keep justice costs down, or by a simple lack of funds.  Given the general attitude towards 
prisoner’s rights however, as conveyed through the Irish courts’ rulings, it unfortunately seems 
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more likely that they did not want to legislate an opportunity to be held accountable for 
miscarriages of Justice.   
It is more important to consider the reforms which did pass, in New York.  No law was 
cited for the right of prisoners to legal representation in New York, because there is no statute 
which directly addresses this.  There are a variety of non-profit organizations attempting to fill 
this need, like the one North Carolina has on contract with the Department of Corrections.  
Attention turns then to the one place where New York has instituted reforms: caseload pressures.  
As previously discussed in the literature, caseload pressure has be traditionally thought of as a 
major contributor to the dysfunctions of the legal system, not the least of which is lengthy 
pretrial detention.  According to the New York State Office of Indigent Legal Services, in 
response to many academic reports, including one from the American Bar Association, the state 
of New York imposed limits on the caseloads of “indigent legal service lawyers” (“Upstate 
Quality Improvement…”, 2013).  This was the first time any such measure was ever 
implemented in the state; it began with the passage of the state budget in 2009, which added in 
the cap, but only in New York City (Eligon, 2009).  This was a major improvement, as the 
“Legal Aid Soceity,” the largest of the legal non-profits, was, at any given time, handling 103 
cases simultaneously, which did not allow the attorneys adequate time for each case (Eligon, 
2009).  Prior to the caseload caps, an attorney for the indigent in New York City could be 
handling up to 115 cases at once, making up to “10 court appearances a day” (Eligon, 2009).  
Although the change was not accompanied by an increased budget (Eligon, 2009), thankfully, 
the experimental measure helped in the city, enabling it to be expanded to upstate New York in 
2013 (“Upstate Quality Improvement…”, 2013).  The expansion to a statewide measure was 
spurred on by “the New York Civil Liberties Union on behalf of indigent criminal defendants in 
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Hurrell-Harring et al V State of New York in 2010 (“Upstate Quality Improvement…”, 2013).  
This time, the measure came with a 4 million dollar allocation for “local initiatives” to alleviate 
“excessive caseloads in upstate public defender offices” and to create “quality control” for 
indigent legal services (“Upstate Quality Improvement…”, 2013).  While North Carolina law is 
concerned with meeting minimum requirements for representation, New York is setting 
standards for ensuring that representation is adequate to the case at hand.  In addition to the 
initial 4 million dollars, the Office of Indigent Legal Services designated 12 million dollars in 
grants to help meet the caseload caps in 45 counties over the course of three years (“Upstate 
Quality Improvement…”, 2013).  The measures, collectively, seem to be working.  A study 
released in 2015 by the state courts found that indigent defendants have benefited from the 
caseload caps (Stashenko, 2015).   
As for reforms in the United States overall, the many successful cases of exoneration 
through DNA evidence, in the early 2000’s, achieved by the Innocence Project in the US 
contributed to the passing of two key pieces of reform legislation: the “Advancing Justice 
Through DNA Technology Act” and the “Justice for All Act” (Hardy, 2009).  These acts 
provided approximately 1 billion dollars in funding for DNA testing for exonerations and 
another billion for the processing of DNA evidence backlogs nationwide and prevent future 
backlogs by training more “personnel” (Hardy, 2009).  They also set higher compensation rates 
for the wrongfully imprisoned (Hardy, 2009).   
Conversely, the UK reforms are worded ambiguously and have been the subject of much 
controversy due to the budgetary cuts and restriction of legal aid for the imprisoned, making this 
2012 reform a step backwards (Bowcott, 2015).  However, it is still possible to block some of the 
damage.  The budget cuts to prisoners’ legal aid, adopted in the 2012 Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
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Punishment of Offenders Act, have been found by the British Court of Appeals to be “illegal” 
(Bowcott, 2015).  The main argument was that this would prevent prisoners from “effectively 
challeng[ing] the conditions under which they are held,” and have an especially profound impact 
on the mentally challenged (Bowcott, 2015).  The 2012 Act sought to remove legal aid for 
parole, discipline, discrimination, and other cases (Bowcott, 2015).  A more in-depth hearing 
over this matter in the appeals court is set for spring of 2016 (Bowcott, 2015).   
Although North Carolina has not made any reforms with regards to pretrial detention or 
legal representation for the incarcerated, it is “the only state that has an agency specifically 
dedicated to reviewing innocence claims” (Giannelli, 2012 p.1).  Also, when, in 2012, a major 
forensics lab scandal was exposed in North Carolina where technicians,  who were working 
with law enforcement, altered, misplaced, or failed to report exonerating evidence in 
hundreds of cases, the state was forced to respond with quick reforms.  One such reform was 
to open the accreditation of labs to any accrediting agency, so that there is no longer a 
monopoly on the approval of forensics labs (Giannelli, 2012 p.4).  The other three reforms 
are all essentially things that happen on paper, and may or may not have a real impact on 
whether such misconduct continues in the future.  The crime labs now serve the “public and 
the criminal justice system” rather than the “prosecuting officers of the state;” 
misrepresenting evidence in a legal disclosure is now specifically a crime; and “a Forensic 
Science Advisory Board” was established (Giannelli, 2012 p.4).  Although these reforms are 
more of a bandaid, and do not address the heart of the problems which led to these actions, at 
least they are a step in the right direction. 
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